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EPA’s Category 3
Marine Emissions Standards
MIMICKING MARPOL ANNEX VI OR
MOCKING THE CLEAN AIR ACT?
I.

INTRODUCTION

With all the emphasis that the media places on
automobile emissions, 1 many citizens would be shocked to
know that on a typical day, container ships 2 docking at the Port
of Los Angeles release more smog-forming pollutants than one
million cars. 3 In fact, ships produce almost as much pollution
in the Los Angeles/Long Beach area as the 350 largest
industrial polluters in Southern California combined. 4 While
great strides have been made by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and state legislators 5 to reduce emissions from
automobiles 6 and stationary point sources, 7 little attention has
1

See, e.g., Tim Molloy, L.A. Air Quality Better, But Still Bad, MONTEREY
COUNTY HERALD, Nov. 5, 2004; Tony Manolatos, Drivers may pay for clean air,
DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 6, 2005, at 1.
2
“Container ships are cargo ships that carry all of their load in truck-size
containers.” Wikipedia, Container ship, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/container_ship
(last visited January 24, 2005). Container ships are some of the largest vessels to sail
the ocean, only outsized by crude oil carriers or tankers. Id. The majority of container
ships have diesel engines. Id.
3
Gary Polakovic, Finally Tackling L.A.’s Worst Air Polluter, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 2002, at B1.
4
Craig Welch, Bush Cut Some Diesel Pollution but Let Big Ships Keep
Spewing, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at A1.
5
State legislatures are involved in developing environmental legislation
through the creation of state implementation plans or SIPs, which specify emissions
limitations, control measures, and the methods to be used in that state to satisfy the
Clean Air Act requirements. THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 45 (Robert J. Martineau,
Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 2d ed. 2004). States are generally given deference by the
EPA in developing their own SIPs, as well as in interpreting and implementing their
SIP programs. Id. at 46.
6
E.g., Control of Emissions of Air Polluion from Highway Heavy-Duty
Engines, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,693 (Oct. 21, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 86)
(reducing NOx emissions from highway diesel engines by 50% in 2004); Control of Air
Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards and
Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. 5002 (Jan. 18, 2001)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 69, 80, 96) [hereinafter 66 Fed. Reg. 5002] (decreasing
NOx and particulate matter emissions from heavy duty trucks and buses by 90 to 95%
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been given to the emissions from large marine vessels, which
utilize some of the dirtiest engines in the world. 8 Given the
negative impact these huge vessels have on air quality, it is
imperative to question why the EPA has not implemented
regulations greatly reducing their emissions.
This Note will analyze the rules promulgated by the
EPA in 2003 to regulate the environmental emissions from
large cargo and cruise ships. 9 Part II begins by examining the
This section
EPA’s Category 3 emissions 10 regulations.
discusses the underlying Executive Branch bias that affected
the EPA’s decision-making process in promulgating its final
rule. Due to political pressure, the EPA limited the scope of
beginning in 2007); Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor
Vehicle Emission Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg.
6698, 6724 (Feb. 20, 2000) (reducing total NOx by 4.5% in 2007 and 14.5% in 2030 by
controlling emissions from new passenger cars and light trucks). Many states have
also mandated the use of special reformulated gasoline that reduces air pollution by
producing fewer emissions. See, e.g., Approval of Promulgation and Implementation
Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,706, 59,710 (Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52)
[hereinafter 64 Fed. Reg. 59,706] (proposing the use of reformulated gas in New York);
Max Jarman, Reformulation, Demand Drive Valley Gas Costs Up, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov.
4, 2004, at D1 (discussing the use of reformulated gasoline in Arizona). Meanwhile,
other states directly invite citizens to file complaints about the emissions from other
automobiles. See, e.g., Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, Smoking Vehicle
Program,
http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/implementation/air/mobilesource/vetech/
smokingvehicles.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). For example, in Texas, citizens may
log onto the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality’s (TCEQ) website and report
a car, truck, or bus that was producing fumes. Id. After an online report has been filed
with the TCEQ, the owner of the offending vehicle will be notified that the automobile
may be excessively contributing to air pollution. Id. The purpose of the TCEQ’s online
reporting system is to inform vehicle owners that car maintenance can improve air
quality and vehicle performance. Id.
7
A stationary source is “any building, structure, facility, or installation
which emits or may emit any air pollutant.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (2000). Under this
definition, both a power plant and an individual boiler are stationary sources. THE
CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 177. E.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 59,706, supra note
6, at 59,712 (proposing NOx and volatile organic compound (VOC) reductions from
stationary sources in New York, which were later approved by the EPA without a
detailed discussion in Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 66 Fed.
Reg. 23,849 (May 10, 2001)) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52); Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Non-Attainment New Source Review (NSR):
Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance, Repair and
Replacement, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,248, 61,249 (Oct. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 51 & 52) (detailing the New Source Review process which mandates that new
stationary sources or existing sources that undergo modifications obtain permits
limiting emissions. Existing sources need only obtain permits under the New Source
Review program if the modifications change the method of operation or increase the
amount of pollutants emitted).
8
Gary Polakovic, supra note 3.
9
Control of Emissions from New Marine Compression-Ignition Engines at or
Above 30 Liters per Cylinder, 68 Fed. Reg. 9746 (Feb. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9, 94) [hereinafter 68 Fed. Reg. 9746].
10
See infra note 20 (defining Category 3 vessels).
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Category 3 emissions regulations to only U.S.-flagged vessels
even though the agency had jurisdiction to reach all vessels
entering U.S. ports. 11 As a result, the regulations fail to meet
the mandate of Section 213(a)(3) of the Clean Air Act of 2000
(CAA) 12 and will not regulate the emissions from the majority
of the vessels polluting U.S. air. 13 Part III describes the
international standards that regulate Category 3 emissions. 14
This section explains why the United States is obligated to
abide by these international regulations 15 and how the EPA’s
standards place U.S.-flagged vessels at a disadvantage
compared to foreign-flagged vessels. Finally, Part IV examines
the latest legal challenge to the EPA’s regulations, which were
upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court under arbitrary and
capricious review. 16 This section asserts that the D.C. Circuit
Court had a duty to require the EPA to take a “hard look” 17 at
the alternatives and evidence; however, the court failed to do so
even though Congress has recently taken steps to try to ensure
future EPA decisions are based on science rather than
politics. 18 The Note concludes with a plea to the judiciary and
the legislature to take action to prevent the Executive Branch
from using political pressure to make a mockery of the goals of
the CAA.

11

See infra Part II.D (discussing how the EPA has jurisdiction over Category
3 vessels, including those that are foreign-flagged).
12
42 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3) (2000).
13
Control of Emissions from New Marine Compression-Ignition Engines at or
Above 30 Liters per Cylinder, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, 37,563 (May 29, 2002) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 94) [hereinafter 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548] (noting that approximately 94% of
the vessels that call to U.S. ports are foreign-flagged vessels).
14
See infra Part III (discussing MARPOL Annex VI, the international treaty
regulating Category 3 vessel emissions).
15
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of Ships 1973,
Article 5(4). See infra Part III.B.
16
Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 412-13 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
17
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 385 (1989); Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton,
458 F.2d 827, 838 (1972).
18
H.R. 3096, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2233, 108th Cong. (2004).
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WHY THE EPA’S CATEGORY 3 EMISSIONS RULEMAKING IS
INADEQUATE

A.

Political Bias Affected the EPA’s Category 3 Emissions
Rulemaking
As the result of a settlement, 19 the EPA proposed
regulations limiting air pollution produced by large marine
vessels with an engine displacement at or above 30 liters per
cylinder (hereinafter referred to as either Category 3 vessels or
engines). 20
The EPA’s final rule regulating Category 3 vessel
emissions directly conflicts with the agency’s original position
on the subject. 21 Upon reading the EPA’s final Category 3
rulemaking notice, one might initially accept the agency’s
explanation that it is best for the U.S. to refrain from
regulating foreign-flagged Category 3 vessels until more
stringent international regulations are adopted because
uniform standards are needed to improve air quality
domestically and internationally. 22 However, one becomes
skeptical of the agency’s explanation upon learning that a 2002
19
Settlement Agreement at 2, Earth Island Inst. v. EPA, No. 00-1065 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 26, 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/largesi/
setlemnt.pdf [hereinafter Earth Island Settlement]. This settlement was a product of a
suit brought by Earth Island Institute and Bluewater Network against the EPA. Id.
The petitioners sought review of a final rule promulgated by the EPA in 1999 to
regulate emissions from new marine compression-ignition engines at or above 37 kW.
Id. The environmental groups alleged that the EPA’s 1999 rule violated the Clean Air
Act because it failed to establish emission standards for certain marine engines. Teri
Shore, Environmental Perspective Marine Emissions and Air Quality Impacts 6 (2004),
http://www.bluewaternetwork.org/reports/rep_cv_shipping.pdf. The case settled with
the EPA agreeing to issue a proposed rule to regulate nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions
from Category 3 marine compression-ignition engines prior to April 30, 2002. Earth
Island Settlement, supra, at 2.
20
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9. Category 3 marine vessels are typically
large seagoing vessels such as “container ships, tankers, bulk carriers, and cruise
ships.” Id. However, some of these vessels do navigate on the Great Lakes. 67 Fed.
Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,564. In contrast, Category 1 marine diesel engines
are similar to land-based engines utilized in construction and farm equipment. Id.
Category 1 engines have a specific engine displacement of less than 5.0 liters per
cylinder. Id. Category 2 engines are similar to locomotive engines. Id. The specific
engine displacement of Category 2 engines is between 5.0 and 30 liters per cylinder.
Id.
21
Compare 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, with JEAN MARIE REVELT,
ASSESSMENT AND STANDARDS DIVISION, DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR THE CONTROL OF
EMISSIONS FROM NEW MARINE COMPRESSION-IGNITION ENGINES AT OR ABOVE 30
LITERS/CYLINDER – DOCUMENTS FORWARDED TO OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
(March
20,
2002)
available
at
http://docket.epa.gov/edkpub/do/
EDKStaffItemDetailView;jsessionid=816E1367812C5058C68C413F8C35C7B1?objectId
=090007d48014de71 [hereinafter LETTER TO OMB].
22
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9750.
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draft of the EPA’s proposal to regulate Category 3 vessel
emissions under the CAA stated that foreign-flagged vessels
should be regulated. 23 The EPA expressed this initial opinion
in a memorandum written to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), 24 explaining that “it may be appropriate and
within EPA’s authority to treat engines on foreign vessels that
enter U.S. ports as new engines and subject to regulation under
section 213 [of the CAA] based on their significant emissions
contribution to air quality problems in the United States.” 25
Further, the document noted that not only would the engine
upgrades required to meet the proposed standards be relatively
inexpensive, but pollution would be significantly reduced as a
result of this new rulemaking. 26 The agency’s memorandum
also explained that emissions from foreign vessels should be
regulated in order to be consistent with the intent of the CAA,
as well as from a pure policy perspective. 27 However, the
agency’s emission policy abruptly changed after the EPA and
the OMB began discussing the EPA’s proposed Category 3
regulations. 28 After the OMB gave its input to the EPA and
“aligned” the EPA’s plan with the President’s policies, 29 the
EPA’s May 2002 Federal Register notice merely invited
comments from interested parties regarding whether the
agency had the authority to regulate emissions from foreign
vessels 30 and whether a lower limit than the international
standard should be placed on the sulfur content of the fuel used

23

LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 2.
The Office of Management and Budget reviews agency rulemaking through
in-depth regulatory reviews. OMB in Perspective, Office of Management and Budget,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization/omb_overview_slides.pdf (last visited
January 3, 2005). The agency is responsible for aligning the “actions, policies, and
statements and proposals to reflect the President’s policies.” Id.
25
LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 58.
26
Id. at 12 (noting that if the agency instituted tougher Tier 2 regulations,
which would reduce pollution by 11% by 2030, total vessel costs would only increase by
0.1%).
27
Id. at 59. See infra Part II.E.1 (discussing the EPA’s initial arguments to
the OMB).
28
Welch, supra note 4. The OMB and EPA discussed how to revise the
proposed regulations in April 2002. See JEAN MARIE REVELT, MATERIALS SUBMITTED
TO EPA FROM THE OFFICE OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (April 27, 2002) available at
http://docket.epa.gov/edkpub/do/EDKStaffItemDetailView;jsessionid=816E1367812C50
58C68C413F8C35C7B1?objectId=090007d48014de71. A revised April 26, 2002 portion
of the rulemaking shows that the EPA removed its discussion of the appropriateness of
regulating foreign vessels. Compare id. with LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21.
29
See supra note 24.
30
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,551.
24
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by Category 3 vessels in U.S. waters. 31 Essentially, the OMB
pressured the EPA to propose emissions standards that went
no further than the current performance from ships. 32
B.

The EPA’s Final Category 3 Rule

The final Category 3 emissions rule, published on
February 28, 2003, provided an exemption to all foreign-flagged
vessels, 33 placed a limit on nitrogen oxide (NOx), 34 and failed to
set any standards regulating the sulfur content of marine
fuel. 35 The regulation mentions two tiers of NOx emission
controls. 36 Tier 1 controls were instituted in 2004 and are
intended to be equivalent to internationally negotiated NOx
standards. 37 The standards only apply to new U.S.-flagged
vessels with engines built on or after January 1, 2004. 38 The
EPA also reserved the option of adopting Tier 2 regulations to
The agency
further reduce NOx limits in the future. 39
additionally noted that when it reconsiders the standards in
2007, it will investigate placing a limit on the sulfur content of
31
Id. at 37,548. Marine fuel currently has an international maximum sulfur
content of 50,000 ppm or 5%. EU Reaches Accord on Ship Emission Sulfur Limits,
LLOYD’S LIST, June 29, 2004, at 12. The sulfur content of fuel is regulated because
sulfur oxide or SOx is formed when fuels containing sulfur are burned. SO2: What Is
It?
Where Does It Come From?, Environmental Protection Agency,
http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/so2/what1.html. SOx is a regulated pollutant that
causes respiratory problems, aggravates heart and lung diseases, contributes to acid
rain, and causes visibility impairment through the formation of fine particles in the air.
Chief Causes For Concern, Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/air/
urbanair/so2/chf1.html.
32
Welch, supra note 4; see also 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9769.
33
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9759.
34
Id. at 9761. Nitrogen oxide is an ingredient of ground-level ozone. Id. at
9751. Ground-level ozone is the primary component in smog, which causes respiratory
problems, decreases lung function, and aggravates asthma. Id.
35
Id. at 9751.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 9749-50. Although the EPA’s standards are primarily equivalent to
those in the international standard set by MARPOL Annex VI, there are a few
differences between the regulations. Id. at 9769. The major differences between the
international standards and those stipulated in the EPA’s Tier 1 lie within witness
testing, durability requirements, and testing procedures. Id. See also infra Part III
(discussing the international MARPOL Annex VI standards).
38
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9746. However, the EPA adopted a
separate definition of “new vessel” which will also regulate those older U.S.-flagged
vessels that have undergone a “major conversion.” Id. at 9760. This change to the
definition of new vessels is necessary because the average Category 3 vessel is used for
25 years, but a substantial percentage of U.S.-flagged ships are over 30 years old. 40
C.F.R. Part 94, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (April 30, 2002) at 30-31, RIN 2060AJ98 [hereinafter Notice of Proposed Rulemaking].
39
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9762.
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marine fuel and will reconsider whether to impose the new Tier
2 standards upon foreign-flagged vessels. 40
The EPA promulgated these regulations limiting the
emissions from Category 3 vessels to fulfill the agency’s
obligations under Section 213 of the CAA. 41 Under the CAA,
the EPA must promulgate National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for criteria pollutants, 42 including lead,
sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), carbon monoxide
(CO), particulate matter (PM), 43 and ozone. 44 These standards
are intended to protect human health and to limit maximum
air quality concentrations. 45 Areas with poorer air quality than
permitted under the NAAQS requirements are designated
“nonattainment” areas. 46 Section 213(a)(1) of the CAA orders
the EPA Administrator to determine whether nonroad engines
“cause, or significantly contribute to, air pollution that may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.” 47 If the Administrator determines that nonroad
engine emissions of CO, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), 48
and NOx significantly contribute to ozone or CO emissions in
40
Id. Final Tier 2 standards for Category 3 engines will be provided by the
EPA on or before April 27, 2007. Id. at 9763. The EPA also noted that future Tier 2
regulations may contain HC (hydrocarbon) and CO (carbon monoxide) emissions
standards to ensure that these emissions do not increase on an engine-specific basis.
Id.
41
Id. at 9748.
42
42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000); National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS), Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html.
43
Particulate matter (PM) is a term used to describe fine particles in the air,
such as dust, dirt, soot, or smoke. Particulate Matter – What Is It? Where Does It
Come From?, Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/
pm/what1.html. PM has been linked to causing premature mortality, decreasing lung
function, and aggravating respiratory and cardiovascular disease, as well as asthma.
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9752.
44
Bernard F. Hawkings, Jr. & Mary Ellen Ternes, The New Source Review
Program: Prevention of Significant Deterioriation and Nonattainment New Source
Review, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 131. Ground-level ozone is
the primary component in smog. 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9751. Ozone
impacts human health by causing respiratory problems, aggravating asthma, and
decreasing lung function. 67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,557. Upon
inhalation, it can lead to changes in lung tissue. Id. Furthermore, ozone reduces crop
yields and forest ecosystem productivity. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note
38, at 23.
45
42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000).
46
Hawkings & Ternes, supra note 44, at 132.
47
42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(1) (2000).
48
Volatile organic compounds, or VOCs, combine with NOx to form ozone.
Ground-level Ozone: What Is It? Where Does It Come From?, Environmental
Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/ozone/what.html. For a discussion
of ground-level ozone, see supra note 44.
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multiple non-attainment areas, the EPA is then required to set
emission standards for the different classes of engines that
contribute to this problem. 49 In 1994, the EPA determined that
nonroad engines do significantly contribute to NOx
nonattainment 50 and marine engines should be regulated.
Thus, the EPA initiated the rulemaking procedures to propose
new regulations for nonroad engines. 51
C.

The Need For More Stringent Category 3 Regulations

While the EPA has taken progressive steps to severely
tighten emission standards for highway vehicles 52 and other
types of nonroad diesel engines, 53 the diesel engines on
Category 3 vessels continue to emit pollutants virtually free of
regulation. 54 The lack of regulation on large marine vessels is
surprising since most Category 3 vessels burn “bunker fuel,” a
low quality petroleum that is capable of producing
approximately “fifty times more haze-forming pollutants than
the dirtiest diesel trucks on U.S. highways.” 55 Marine vessels
release hazardous emissions while they are moving in and out
of ports, as well as when they are loading and unloading cargo
while docked. 56 Since diesel emissions are likely human

49

42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (2000).
Control of Air Pollution; Determination of Significance for Nonroad
Sources and Emission Standards for New Nonroad Compression-Ignition Engines at or
Above 37 Kilowatts, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,306, 31,307 (June 17, 1994) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9 & 89).
51
Id. at 31,336.
52
The EPA promulgated rules limiting PM and NOx emissions from heavy
duty engines by 90% and 95%, respectively. 66 Fed. Reg. 5002, supra note 6, at 5002.
Furthermore, the regulations on heavy duty engines also reduce diesel sulfur content
by 97%, slashing sulfur content to 15 ppm beginning June 1, 2006. Id. at 5002, 5006.
As a result, the fuel sulfur content standard for heavy duty engines will match that of
highway diesel engines. Compare id. with Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from
Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69 Fed. Reg. 38,958, 38,960 (June 29, 2004) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 69, et al.) [hereinafter 69 Fed. Reg. 38,958].
53
New regulations will reduce PM and NOx emissions from nonroad diesel
engines used in the construction, agricultural, industrial, and mining industries by
95% and 90%, respectively. 69 Fed. Reg. 38,958, supra note 52, at 38,960. The EPA
has also dramatically reduced the sulfur content used in these nonroad engines by 99%
so that the standard will match the 15 ppm highway diesel engine standard. Id.
54
Polakovic, supra note 3. James J. Corbett, a professor of marine policy at
the University of Delaware noted that current controls on ship emissions are
approximately equivalent to where the emissions controls were on cars in 1965. Id.
55
Id.
56
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,571 (explaining that many ships
produce “hotelling” emissions when they run one or several engines to produce
electricity while in port loading or unloading the vessel).
50
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carcinogens, 57 there is cause for great concern about the lack of
regulation of marine engine emissions.
Furthermore,
emissions from diesel engines contribute to the production of
smog, 58 the green house effect, 59 and the formation of acid
rain. 60 Due to the emissions produced by Category 3 vessels,
many commercial ports and coastal cities are out of attainment
with respect to the NAAQS for ozone, PM, and CO. 61 By 2020,
emissions from marine diesel engines will account for
approximately three to twenty-eight percent of mobile source
NOx emissions in certain port cities. 62 Moreover, the problem of
air pollution caused by marine vessels is not isolated to port
cities. 63 Marine emissions also affect the air quality in areas
located near heavy shipping channels. 64 Because marine
vessels move from port to port, and from country to country,
the problem of marine vessel air pollution is global. 65
57
Michael J. Horowitz, Regulation of Mobile Sources: Motor Vehicles,
Nonroad Engines, and Aircraft, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at
323.
58
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,552 & n.3.
59
BLUEWATER NETWORK, A STACKED DECK: AIR POLLUTION FROM LARGE
SHIPS
3
(2000),
available
at
http://www.bluewaternetwork.org/reports/rep_ss_ships_stackeddeck.pdf.
60
Id. at 4.
61
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,562. The EPA’s own data
estimates that Category 3 emissions accounted for 7.4% of the NOx emissions in the
non-attainment area of Baton Rouge/New Orleans in 1996, a contribution that is
expected to increase to 15.8% by 2020. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38,
at 36. This increase is due not only to anticipated increases in shipping traffic, but also
the decreasing contribution of highway vehicles, as the EPA tightens motor vehicle
pollution regulations. Id. at 35.
62
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,548.
63
Reports conducted by the Department of Defense show that emissions
released within 60 nautical miles of the coastline make it back to land. Id. at 37,560.
A report from the Ozone Transport Assessment Group estimates that emissions within
the continental U.S. can affect air quality in locations up to 500 miles from the source.
Id. at 37,580. Therefore, marine emissions can greatly decrease the air quality even in
areas without large ports simply because the area is near the shoreline. Id. at 37,563.
For example, marine vessels contribute to approximately 37% of the total NOx in Santa
Barbara. Id. As the amount of NOx pollution created by motor vehicles decreases,
marine emissions are anticipated to increase to 62% of the NOx production in Santa
Barbara by 2015. Id. at 37,562-63.
64
Id.
65
See, e.g., Press Release, Clean Ships Get Into Gear After Years of Slow
Steaming, European Union Press Releases, European Commission (June 28, 2004),
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/810
&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (noting ships are the
largest source of SO2 emissions in the EU). Regardless of where emissions are initially
released, air pollutants often have an international impact because the pollutants
become trapped in upper air winds, moving along with the weather patterns and
traveling internationally. See International Issues & U.S. Air Quality, Environmental
Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/international.html.
See also
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Jurisdiction to Regulate Foreign-Flagged Vessels

Despite the EPA’s failure to extend its Category 3
rulemaking to foreign-flagged vessels, the U.S. is not
preempted from regulating the emissions from foreign vessels
or even from creating stricter standards than the
internationally agreed upon marine pollution standards. 66 In
fact, the EPA has jurisdiction to control the emissions from
foreign-flagged vessels based on international law. 67
In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. 68 (hereinafter
Aramco), the Supreme Court held that legislation does not
apply extraterritorially unless there is a clearly expressed
intention that Congress meant for the legislation to apply
outside the U.S. 69 This principle is founded upon the policy
that limiting the scope of legislation to U.S. territories prevents
international clashes of law and international discord. 70
However, the presumption against extraterritoriality does not
apply in three specific situations. 71 First, the presumption is
not applicable if Congress expressed an affirmative intent for
the legislation to apply to activities in other countries. 72
Second, the presumption does not apply when failure to extend
the statute to a foreign country would adversely affect the
U.S. 73 Finally, the presumption against extraterritoriality is
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe, http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/lrtap_h1.htm (last visited
January 3, 2005) (explaining that scientists discovered in the 1960s that emissions
from continental Europe were polluting Scandinavian lakes).
66
MARPOL Annex VI, Chapter 2, Regulation 10(4), http://www.imo.org (last
visited April 6, 2006) (follow “Information Resources” hyperlink; then follow “Free IMO
Texts” and “MARPOL” hyperlinks to access Annex VI) [hereinafter MARPOL Annex
VI]. See infra Part III (discussing the international Category 3 standards). See also
Dan Lickel, Comment, Regulating Foreign Vessels Under the Clean Air Act: The Case
for a Permissible Administrative Interpretation, 3 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 145 (2002).
67
Lickel, supra note 66, at 160-65.
68
499 U.S. 244 (1991). Aramco involved a Title VII claim brought by a U.S.
citizen employed abroad by a United States employer regarding the company’s
employment practices. Id. at 246-47.
69
Id. at 248. See also Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)
(stating that unless a contrary intent of Congress is shown, legislation is meant to only
apply within the U.S. territory since Congress is primarily concerned with domestic
issues).
70
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963)).
71
Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (1993).
72
Id. See also Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248; Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo,
S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
73
Massey, 986 F.2d at 531. This exception to the presumption typically
applies to cases of anti-trust, securities, or trademark laws. Id. See, e.g., Steele v.
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not valid when the conduct being regulated occurs within the
United States. 74 Here, the third exception clearly applies to
emissions created by foreign-flagged ships sailing in U.S.
waters or those that are docked at U.S. ports. 75 Adverse effects
such as poor air quality and the related health problems caused
by air pollution 76 will result in the U.S. if emissions from
foreign-flagged vessels are not regulated, 77 so the second
exception could also arguably apply; however, the second
exception is generally limited to cases involving anti-trust,
securities, or trademark law. 78 Regardless, since the third
exception
applies
here,
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality did not bar the EPA from imposing
regulations upon the emissions from Category 3 foreign-flagged
vessels.
Another presumption against extending U.S. law to
foreign-flagged vessels exists if doing so would interfere with
relations between the crew and the ship’s owner. 79 However,
regulating emissions from foreign-flagged vessels does not
present any “internal affairs” or management issues that would
otherwise preclude exercising control over the vessel while in
U.S. waters. 80 Therefore, as with the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the EPA was also not prevented from
promulgating Category 3 emissions based upon this second
presumption.
With regard to applying laws to foreign entities, “a
nation having some ‘basis’ for jurisdiction to prescribe law
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1952) (Lanham Trade-Mark Act applies
extraterritorially); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968)
(securities laws apply extraterritorially); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416, 443-45 (2d Cir. 1945) (U.S. antitrust laws apply extraterritorially).
74
Massey, 986 F.2d at 531. The “presumption against the extraterritorial
application of statutes described in Aramco does not apply where the conduct regulated
by the statute occurs primarily, if not exclusively, in the United States. . . .” Id. at 529.
See also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 921 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (explaining that “[t]erritoriality-based jurisdiction thus allows states to
regulate the conduct or status of individuals or property physically situated within the
territory”).
75
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959))
(noting that the presumption did not apply when the harm occurred while the vessel
was in U.S. waters).
76
See supra notes 31, 34, 43, 44 for discussion of adverse effects.
77
See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38, at 12, 21-38.
78
See supra note 73.
79
Dowd v. Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n, 975 F.2d 779, 788-89 (11th Cir. 1992).
80
See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S.
10, 21 (1963).
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should nonetheless refrain from exercising that jurisdiction
‘with respect to a person or activity having connections with
another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
Whether it is reasonable to extend
unreasonable.’” 81
jurisdiction over the actions of other nations depends upon
many factors, including “the extent to which the activity takes
place within the territory [of the regulating state]” 82 and “the
character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other
states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the
desirability of such regulation is generally accepted.” 83 Here,
the regulations upon emissions from Category 3 emissions
would affect vessels located within U.S. territory. 84 Further,
improving ambient air quality is of great importance to the
U.S., as evidenced by the expansive scope of the CAA. 85
Moreover, other countries have taken unilateral action to try to
Hence, extending the U.S.’s
reduce marine emissions. 86
jurisdiction over foreign-flagged vessels is reasonable. 87
Merely falling outside the presumptions against
extraterritoriality does not establish U.S. authority to regulate
foreign Category 3 vessels. However, a broad interpretation of
Article 33 of the international UNCLOS 88 treaty may be
81
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the Laws of the United States § 403(1)
(1987)).
82
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 403(2)(a) (1987).
83
§ 403(2)(c).
84
See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1922).
85
42 U.S.C. § 7401(a) (2000). See also LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 52,
59.
86
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,556. For example, Sweden has
unilaterally pushed for stricter emissions reductions from marine vessels. Id. By
differentiating fairway and port dues based upon NOx emissions levels and fuel sulfur
content, Sweden reduced NOx and sulfur emissions by 75% within five years. Id.
87
LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 58.
88
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, art. 33, 1833 U.N.T.S. 409 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter
UNCLOS 1982]. UNCLOS 1982 regulates the uses and resources of the sea, including
navigational rights, territorial sea limits, economic jurisdiction, legal status of
resources on the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, passage of ships
through narrow straits, conservation and management of living marine resources,
protection of the marine environment, and marine research and contains a binding
procedure for settlement of disputes between nations. Oceans and Law of the Sea, The
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective), United
Nations,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_historical_perspective.htm (last visited January 3, 2005). Since UNCLOS
1982 is intended to represent customary international law, the U.S. has acknowledged
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sufficient to allow the United States to extend its jurisdiction
over foreign-flagged vessels. 89 Article 33 of UNCLOS addresses
the contiguous zone, which extends twenty-four miles from the
coast baseline of all shoreline countries that choose to assert
such authority. 90 In order to prevent infringement upon
sanitary laws and regulations, countries may exert control over
the actions of foreign vessels that are in the contiguous zone in
order to protect their territories and seas. 91 The CAA falls
within the ambit of Article 33, which permits states to enforce
environmental laws in the contiguous zone if the law exists to
protect people from direct health threats. 92 Furthermore, the
in several ways that it is bound by the treaty, despite the fact that it has not ratified
UNCLOS 1982. Lickel, supra note 66, at 154 & n.61.
89
Lickel, supra note 66, at 160-62. Lickel’s article also analyzes whether the
U.S. could have authority under Article 21(2) of UNCLOS 1982 to extend the reach of
the CAA to foreign-flagged vessels. Id. at 156. While coastal states generally have full
legislative jurisdiction over foreign vessels within their waters, laws of coastal states
must not “apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships
unless they are given effect to generally accepted international rules or standards.”
G.P. PAMBORIDES, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING LAW: LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT
43 (1999) (quoting Article 21(2) of UNCLOS 1982). However, under Article 21(2), if a
coastal state suspects that a vessel is in violation of its anti-pollution legislation, the
state “may inspect the vessel and institute legal proceedings should they conclude that
the conduct of the vessel was not in compliance.” Id. at 44. Furthermore, coastal
states have full jurisdiction over foreign vessels that have willfully and seriously
violated pollution regulations. Id. Although the jurisdictional reach of coastal states is
rather broad, the enforcement powers of the states are limited to merely arresting
vessels that have violated legislation if there has been “major damage or threat of
major damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal state or to any
resources of its territorial sea.” Id. at 44-45. Even though any future EPA Tier 2
regulations would probably require changes to the construction or design of the vessels,
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9749, it is unlikely that a court would uphold the
EPA’s authority as extending CAA regulations over foreign vessels under Article 21(2)
of UNCLOS because the pollution regulations imposed are more akin to discharge
standards than actual design or construction standards. Lickel, supra note 66, at 15859. In fact, the European Union (EU) rejected using Article 21(2) as the basis to apply
NOx regulations to foreign-flagged vessels prior to the enactment of MARPOL Annex
VI, declaring the regulations to be more like discharge standards than design
standards. Id. Hence, Article 21(2) of UNCLOS is likely insufficient to support
jurisdiction over foreign-flagged vessels. Id. at 159.
90
UNCLOS 1982, supra note 88, art. 33(2), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 409.
The
coastal baseline is the low-water mark along the coast, which is measured at low tide.
Environmental Defender’s Office of Western Australia, Coastal Law Maps,
http://www.edowa.org.au/publications/books/coastlawmaps.html (last visited January
2, 2005). Most countries at least choose to assert control over their own territorial
waters, which extend twelve miles outward from a coastal nation. Tara Magner, A
Less Than ‘Pacific’ Solution for Asylum Seekers in Australia, 16 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L.
53, 74 (2004). UNCLOS 1982 was intended to reflect customary international law, so
the principles contained within it apply to all countries regardless of whether they
have ratified the treaty or not. See Lickel, supra note 66, at 154.
91
UNCLOS 1982, supra note 88, art. 33(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 409.
92
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000) (stating that one of the purposes of the
subchapter is “to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to
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United States has already recognized that Article 33 may be
utilized to assert prescriptive jurisdiction in the contiguous
zone. 93 In fact, the Clean Water Act (CWA) explicitly prohibits
discharges of oil or hazardous substances into the contiguous
zone. 94 Therefore, some environmentalists have compared
regulating emissions from all marine vessels entering U.S.
waters to the authority the United States exercised under the
CWA following the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 95 After this disaster,
Congress instituted tougher safety requirements on ships
entering U.S. waters. 96 Environmentalists argue that the EPA
should now exercise similar jurisdiction over marine emissions
regardless of flagship by instituting tougher air regulations on
Category 3 vessels. 97
Case law further supports the proposition that the EPA
has the authority to promulgate regulations that reach foreignflagged vessels. In Department of Transportation v. Public
Citizen, 98 the respondents filed suit against the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), an agency within the
Department of Transportation, 99 for failure to promulgate
regulations in compliance with National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) 100 and the CAA. 101 The Supreme Court ruled that
promote the public health and welfare”). For a more detailed discussion of the
application of Article 33 to the CAA, see Lickel, supra note 66, at 160-62. Lickel also
discusses a third basis for possibly providing jurisdiction through Article 56(b) of
UNCLOS 1982, but determines that such an argument is weaker since hard scientific
evidence would be necessary to prove a link between the marine engine emissions and
a negative impact on fisheries or the coastal marine environment. Id. at 162-64.
93
Lickel, supra note 66, at 161.
94
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3)(A) (2004)).
95
See Welch, supra note 4.
96
See Oil Pollution Act Overview, http://www.epa.gov/oilspill/opaover.htm;
Oil Pollution Act § 4115 (1990) (codified as amended 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a)) (requiring
vessels to be equipped with a double hull if they are carrying oil in the United States).
97
Welch, supra note 4.
98
541 U.S. 752 (2004). At issue here was whether FMCSA needed to
consider the environmental effects caused by an “increase in the number of roadside
inspections of Mexican trucks and buses due to the [agency’s] proposed regulations.”
Id. at 761.
99
Id. at 758.
100
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 83 Stat. 852
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2000)). NEPA was established with
the intent of reducing environmental damage by requiring that federal agencies
evaluate the environmental impacts of their proposed actions. Public Citizen, 541 U.S.
at 756-57. Under NEPA, federal agencies must prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), evaluating the proposed project’s possible environmental impacts. Id.
at 757. Although NEPA contains this procedural requirement, the Act imposes no
substantive requirements upon the agency. Id. at 756. Hence, once the EIS procedural
requirement has been fulfilled, agencies cannot be forced to choose a specific action
based upon the findings in the EIS. Id.

2005]

EPA’S CATEGORY 3 MARINE EMISSIONS STANDARDS

1079

FMCSA was not statutorily required under NEPA to consider
the environmental effects caused by Mexican-domiciled motor
carriers crossing into the United States. 102 The Court’s decision
hinged on the role that FMSCA occupied in regulating these
Since FMCSA merely grants registration to
vehicles. 103
vehicles, the Court determined that the administration did not
need to address the environmental emissions from foreign
automobiles since FMCSA itself lacks statutory authority to
create or enforce emission controls. 104 Nowhere in its decision
did the Court state that an agency with direct authority to
promulgate regulations on emission controls, such as the
EPA, 105 would be unable to reach these vehicles. 106 In fact, the
EPA has noted that the scope of its authority to regulate motor
vehicles crossing the U.S. border is broad and covers “virtually
any, if not all” motor vehicles. 107
Just as the EPA has broad authority to regulate motor
vehicles within and crossing into the United States, 108 the
agency commented in its 2002 memo to the OMB that it should
have similarly broad authority under the CAA to regulate new
nonroad engines. 109 The EPA’s argument is supported by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon. 110 In
Cunard, the Court determined that the National Prohibition
Act was so broad that it applied to foreign-flagged passenger
ships, banning them from storing liquor onboard while the
vessels were in U.S. ports. 111 In assessing the reach of the
Prohibition Act, the Cunard Court noted that the Prohibition
legislation made no distinction between domestic and foreignflagged vessels. 112 Therefore, the Court refused to infer that
Congress intended to provide an exemption to foreign-flagged
vessels. 113 The Cunard Court emphasized that providing such
an exception to foreign-flagged vessels would actually
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 756.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 772.
Id.
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
See generally Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752.
LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 59.
Id.
Id.
262 U.S. 100 (1923).
Id. at 125-26.
Id. at 126.
Id.
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“embarrass” enforcement of Prohibition, while defeating the
purpose of the Act. 114 More recently, the 11th Circuit affirmed
the Cunard Court’s conclusion by declaring in Stevens v.
Premier Cruises, Inc. 115 that Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) is not inapplicable, as a matter of law, to
foreign-flagged cruise ships sailing in U.S. waters. 116 As in
Cunard, the Stevens court determined that it would be
“strange” if Congress only intended Title III of the ADA to
apply to domestic cruise ships, despite the breadth of the Act. 117
Here, with regard to regulating Category 3 vessel emissions,
even the EPA admits that Section 213 of the CAA has a broad
purpose and reach. 118 Given the scope of the CAA, it definitely
would be “strange” if Congress only intended Section 213 to
apply to domestic ships in U.S. waters 119 because such an
exemption would defeat the purpose of the Act, 120 which is to
control emissions that “cause, or contribute to significant air
pollution problems.” 121 Since the EPA has already determined
that Category 3 vessels cause or contribute to significant air
pollution problems, 122 all vessels entering U.S. ports should be
regulated by the CAA. 123
In sum, the U.S. has previously extended its jurisdiction
over foreign-flagged vessels located in U.S. waters if the act at
issue is sufficiently broad. 124 This precedent provides a sound
basis for the EPA to exercise authority over foreign-flagged
vessels within the agency’s Category 3 regulations in order to
further the CAA’s goal of providing clean ambient air. 125

114

Id.
215 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2000).
116
Id. at 1243. Furthermore, even when an act takes place outside U.S.
territory, the Court has recognized that statutes can still be interpreted as applying
abroad if the act has a “broad jurisdictional grant,” Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344
U.S. 280, 286 (1952), and “sweeping reach.” Id. at 287.
117
Stevens, 215 F.3d at 1243.
118
LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 58-59.
119
Cf. Stevens, 215 F.3d at 1243.
120
Cf. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 126 (1923).
121
42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(1) (2000).
122
See supra notes 50 and 51, and accompanying text.
123
Cf. Cunard, 262 U.S. 100 at 126; Stevens, 215 F.3d at 1243.
124
See, e.g., Cunard, 262 U.S. at 126; Stevens, 215 F.3d at 1243.
125
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(2) (2000).
115
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E.

Category 3 Rulemaking is Not Consistent with the CAA
or the EPA’s Past Rulemaking

The EPA’s Category 3 rulemaking is questionable for
several reasons. First, the regulation misinterprets the Clean
Air Act and significant terms within the Act. Second, this final
regulation fails to press for advancement in emissions
technology, as required by the CAA and as that section of the
Act is interpreted by the courts. Lastly, allowing foreignflagged vessels to escape regulation is inconsistent with the
agency’s recent crackdown on emissions from other mobile
sources.
1.

EPA’s Final Category 3 Rule Misinterprets the
Clean Air Act

Maritime vessels are not explicitly mentioned anywhere
in the CAA. 126 However, Congress introduced the expansive
category of nonroad engines and vehicles to the CAA through
the 1990 Amendments to the Act. 127 These amendments placed
all marine vessels into the broad category of nonroad engines,
which are regulated by Section 213 of the CAA. 128
The Category 3 final rulemaking notice explains that
the EPA did not make the engines on foreign-flagged vessels
subject to the CAA since they are temporarily within the
country, as opposed to items that have been imported into the
United States. 129 However, the agency’s 2002 memorandum to
the OMB argued that foreign-flagged vessels should be
regulated because the meaning of “import” in the CAA is
In its memo, the EPA explained that
“ambiguous.” 130
“legislative history does not suggest that Title II’s use of
‘import’ can only be given its meaning under the customs laws
of the United States.” 131 According to the EPA, using the
126

See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
128
42 U.S.C. § 7547 (2000).
129
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9759.
130
LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 60.
131
Id. Under customs law, a boat is not imported into the U.S. if there is no
intent to bring the vessel permanently into the country. Am. Customs Brokerage Co. v.
United States, 375 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (Cust. Ct. 1974). Unless Congress clearly
intended otherwise, “the word ‘importation’ means the bringing of goods within the
jurisdictional limits of the United States with the intention to unlade them.” Porto
Rico Brokerage Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 605, 616 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1935) (citing
United States v. Field & Co., 14 U.S. Cust. App. 406, 407 (Cust. App. 1927)).
127
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customs meaning of “import” may not be appropriate in
interpreting Section 213 since the CAA and customs laws have
very different purposes. 132 The agency further cautioned that
interpreting the term “import” as having the same meaning in
the CAA as under customs laws may “frustrate section 213’s
goals” because this interpretation would leave foreign-flagged
vessels unregulated. 133 Supporting the agency’s argument is
precedent from the Supreme Court noting that the word
“import” should be construed in the ordinary sense. 134 As a
result, “import” should be interpreted as meaning “bringing an
article into a country from the outside,” 135 which includes the
country’s ports and harbors. 136 The item need not be brought
into the country through a customs house or even taken off of
the ship itself. 137 Thus, by simply entering the waters or ports
of the United States, a foreign-flagged vessel is subject to the
jurisdiction and laws of the U.S. because it has imported
everything on the vessel. 138
The EPA’s explanation in its 2003 final rulemaking that
foreign vessels are outside the scope of the CAA 139 is also
undercut by the agency’s arguments in 2002 to the OMB
regarding interpretation of the terms “nonroad engines” 140 and
“nonroad vehicles.” 141 In its memorandum to the OMB, the
EPA described the CAA’s use of the term new nonroad engine

132

LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 60.
Id.
134
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 121 (1923). The Cunard Court
faced the issue of whether the alcohol contained on foreign-flagged passenger ships for
the use of the crew and passengers violated the Prohibition Act. Id. at 119. Although
the forbidden spirits stayed onboard the ships, the Court determined that by
construing the term “import” in its ordinary sense, the alcohol had been brought within
U.S. territory, which extends to include ports and harbors. Id. at 122.
135
Id. at 122.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9759.
140
42 U.S.C. § 7550(10) (2000), defining nonroad engine as follows:
133

an internal combustion engine (including the fuel system) that is not used in
a motor vehicle or a vehicle used solely for competition, or that is not subject
to standards promulgated under section 7411 of this title [Standards of
performance for new stationary sources] or section 7521 of this title
[Emission standards for new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines].
141
42 U.S.C. § 7550(11) (2000), defining nonroad vehicle as “a vehicle that is
powered by a nonroad engine and that is not a motor vehicle or a vehicle used solely for
competition.”
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as “ambiguous.” 142
However, the agency noted that the
definitions of nonroad engines and nonroad vehicles were
modeled after the statutory definition “new motor vehicle
engine,” which includes those engines that have been
imported. 143 In fact, neither the term nonroad engine nor
nonroad vehicle discusses the origin of the equipment. 144
Because the Senate expressly instructed the EPA to define
nonroad engines on the basis of function or design, 145 the
agency’s position in the OMB memorandum is reasonable. 146
Critics of the foreign-flag exemption maintain that the EPA
should not be permitted to include other exceptions or
limitations upon the terms nonroad engines and nonroad
vehicles since Congress provided the agency with instructions
on how to properly classify the terms. 147 However, even the
EPA noted in its 2002 OMB memorandum that regulating
foreign-flagged vessels is reasonable because Congress failed to
provide an exemption here, while other types of mobile sources
were given exemptions elsewhere in the CAA. 148 For example,
the Act does not cover new nonroad vehicles and engines used
solely for competition 149 or those used for “research,
investigations, studies, demonstrations, or training or for
reasons of national security.” 150 Therefore, because Congress
provided explicit limiting language in other sections of the Act
to exempt foreign-flagged vessels from the reach of the CAA, 151
there is good reason to believe that Congress did not intend to
provide an exemption here for foreign-flagged vessels. Hence,
it can be argued that there is no basis for the agency’s removal
of foreign-flagged vessels from the category of nonroad
engines. 152
142

LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 58.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7550 (2000)).
144
42 U.S.C. §§ 7550(10)-(11) (2000).
145
S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 104-05 (1989).
146
See Lickel, supra note 66, at 169 (stating that “Congress effectively
enjoined the EPA from classifying marine vessels by flag for the purpose of adopting
regulations”).
147
Id.
148
LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 59.
149
Id. at 60 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7552(10)-(11) (2000)).
150
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7522(b)(1) (2000)).
151
Id. See also Lickel, supra note 66, at 169-70 (explaining that Section 183(f)
of the CAA contains an implicit exception for foreign-flagged vessels by referring to
“different ports,” which can only be interpreted to mean foreign ports since the CAA
clearly reaches all domestic ports).
152
Lickel, supra note 66, at 169. Extending the CAA to reach foreign-flagged
vessels is also reasonable given the past actions and statements of the Executive
143
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The EPA’s Final Rule Fails to Press for
Advanced Technology

Rather than comply with the actual language of Section
213 of the CAA, the OMB convinced the EPA to promulgate
Category 3 emissions regulations 153 that fail to reflect the
mandate of Congress. 154 The EPA’s regulations do not fulfill
the purpose of the CAA because the final rule does not impose
emissions standards that reflect the capabilities of the latest
technology, 155 as required by Section 213. 156
Section 213 of the CAA regulates the emissions
standards for nonroad engines and vehicles. 157 Under this
section, the EPA Administrator is required to promulgate
regulations for new nonroad engines that contribute to air
pollution. 158 Further, the Administrator must set standards
that “achieve the greatest degree of emission reduction
achievable through the application of technology which the
Administrator determines will be available.” 159 Therefore,
Section 213 of the CAA is “a technology-forcing standard” 160
with an overriding goal of air quality. 161
Although
considerations such as cost, noise, energy, and safety are
significant, these factors are intended to be subordinate to the
primary goal of improving air quality whenever a standard is
technology-forcing. 162 In fact, when Section 213 of the CAA was
enacted, the EPA “was expected to press for development and

Branch. For example, President Clinton stated that the CAA can be used to reduce air
pollution within the territorial sea. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39, at 36 (1994) (referring
to nonroad engine sections of the CAA).
153
Welch, supra note 4. See Part II.E.1, supra.
154
See Part II.E.1, supra.
155
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38, at 14 (noting that
“[i]mprovements in fuel systems and engine cooling can reduce Category 3 engine
emissions even more than the Annex VI NOx limits would require.”). See also 67 Fed.
Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,571.
156
42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (2000).
157
42 U.S.C. § 7547 (2000).
158
Id. at § 7547(a)(3).
159
Id.
160
Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Technologyforcing statutes force industry to improve existing methods and develop new strategies
to reduce pollution, rather than rely upon the excuse that better methods do not exist.
Sky Stanfield, The Mobile Source Air Toxics Rule: How Does the Greatest Reduction
Become No Reduction?, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 563, 573 (2004).
161
Husqvarna, 254 F.3d at 200.
162
Id.
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application of improved technology rather than be limited by
that which exists today.” 163
Based upon the language Congress used in this
technology-forcing section regulating nonroad engines and
vehicles, 164 one would expect the EPA to set the emissions
standards that would reflect the newest technological
advancements within the emissions control industry. However,
the EPA’s proposed regulations are based upon information
and studies conducted between the years of 1992 and 1997. 165
The EPA itself acknowledged that in the interim there have
been advancements in NOx control, which would permit further
emission reductions beyond the standards instituted by the
final rule. 166 Specifically, the agency noted that by using incylinder controls, an additional reduction of thirty percent in
NOx levels beyond Tier 1 can be achieved, while reductions fifty
percent beyond Tier 1 NOx levels can be “achieved by
introducing
water
into
the
combustion
process.” 167
Furthermore, the EPA explained that selective catalytic
reduction (SCR) could reduce NOx emissions by more than
ninety percent. 168 At the time the EPA promulgated these
rules, the agency was fully aware that “these [emission
reduction] systems are . . . being used on ferries and cruise
ships,” 169 and that “four slow-speed Category 3 marine engines .
. . have been successfully equipped with SCR units.” 170
Unfortunately, the EPA did not mandate the use of any of
these technologies on Category 3 vessels. 171
While commenting on the capabilities of technology, the
EPA also explained that the technology that will reduce
emissions from Category 3 engines is similar to that already in

163
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(quoting S. REP. NO. 91-1196, 2d. Sess. 24 (1970), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS 424 (1974)). See also H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at
273 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1352.
164
42 U.S.C. § 7547 (2000).
165
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38, at 14.
166
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,571. The EPA also noted that
some countries, such as Sweden, are unilaterally pushing for stricter emissions
reductions from marine vessels. Id. at 37,556. By differentiating fairway and port
dues based upon NOx emissions levels and fuel sulfur content, Sweden reduced NOx
and sulfur emissions by 75% within five years. Id.
167
Id. at 37,588.
168
Id. at 37,589.
169
Id. at 37,590.
170
Id. at 37,591.
171
See generally 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9749-50.
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use on other engines. 172 Although the agency asserted that
Category 3 engines are similar to the engines used at
municipal power plants to generate electricity, 173 the EPA made
no further mention in the Category 3 rulemaking of the
regulations imposed upon or the technologies used at power
plants to control emissions. 174 The agency merely went on to
point out that Category 3 engines are not similar to any landbased mobile engines. 175 However, despite the differences
between Category 3 engines and land-based mobile engines,
the EPA commented that the engineering principles utilized to
control emissions from Category 3 engines and land-based
engines are primarily the same. 176 Therefore, many of the
techniques used to control emissions created by smaller
nonroad and highway diesel engines can be used on Category 3
engines. 177 Considering that there are comparable engines to
the Category 3 engines and these comparable engines are
subject to environmental regulations, 178 the EPA should have
discussed in its rulemaking notice why those available
technologies used to control the emissions from power plants
and smaller nonroad and highway diesel engines are not
mandatory for Category 3 engines. Instead, the EPA refrained
from pressing for development in marine emission controls due
to “outstanding technical issues” and the lack of current
application of existing technology to marine diesel engines. 179
By failing to promulgate regulations that require the use of
technology that is already capable of achieving the stringent
emissions limits placed upon land-based engines, the EPA’s
action appears arbitrary and unsupported by the agency’s own
internal findings.
In sum, the agency’s explanation that it needed
additional time to evaluate the capabilities of technology, 180 is
at odds with the basic premise of technology-forcing

172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,564.
Id.
See generally id.
Id.
Id. at 37,567.
Id.
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000).
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9750.
Id. at 9748.
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standards. 181 When Congress established technology-forcing
standards, the EPA was not expected to be able to make
predictions about future advances in technology. 182 Rather, the
EPA merely needs to identify the primary steps necessary to
develop emission controls and to explain why the agency
believes that industry can find a solution before the phase-in
period 183 concludes. 184 Since the EPA is required to “press for
development,” 185 and is not supposed to be limited by existing
technology in setting technology-forcing standards, 186 the
agency should not be allowed to promulgate Category 3
emission regulations that reflect standards that are over a
decade old. 187
3.

The EPA’s Rulemaking Is Inconsistent With the
Agency’s Past Acts

The EPA’s rulemaking is also inconsistent with the
more stringent standards it promulgated for smaller marine
engines. 188 For example, regulations imposing a nine year
phase-in period from 1998 to 2006 upon spark-ignition marine
engines, including outboard engines, personal watercraft
engines, and jet boat engines, will reduce hydrocarbon
emissions by seventy-five percent in 2025. 189 While the agency
181
See Stanfield, supra note 160, at 573 (2004) (noting that technologyforcing statutes force industry to improve existing methods and develop new strategies
to reduce pollution, rather than rely upon the excuse that better methods do not exist).
182
See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 328 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
183
Phase-in periods are often established to delay when a new regulation will
be enforced in order to allow the affected parties to become familiar with the regulation
and to develop compliance procedures. Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir.
2000).
184
Natural Res. Def. Council, 655 F.2d at 332.
185
S. REP. NO. 91-1196, 2d. Sess. 24 (1970), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS 424 (1974). See also H.R. REP. 95-294,
at 273 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1352.
186
H.R. REP. 95-294, at 273 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077,
1352.
187
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38, at 14.
188
See, e.g., Control of Air Pollution; Final Rule for New Gasoline SparkIgnition Marine Engines; Exemptions for New Nonroad Compression-Ignition Engines
at or Above 37 Kilowatts and New Nonroad Spark-Ignition Engines at or Below 19
Kilowatts, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,088, 52,089 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 89, 90,
and 91).
189
Id. at 52,089-90. See also Control of Emissions From Nonroad Large
Spark-Ignition Engines, and Recreational Engines (Marine and Land-Based), 67 Fed.
Reg. 68,242, 68,244-45 (Nov. 8, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. parts 89, 90, 91, 94,
1048, 1051, 1065, and 1068) (implementing a final rule for control of emissions from
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has been pressing for uniformity in land-based emission
regulations, 190 it is odd that larger marine vessels would not be
subject to environmental regulations similar to those imposed
upon their smaller counterparts.
Ironically, although the EPA recently defended the
Category 3 emissions regulations in court as complying with
the CAA, 191 the U.S. has been lobbying internationally for years
to impose stricter NOx limits upon Category 3 vessels. 192
Several years prior to issuing the EPA’s final rule, the U.S.
submitted a proposal to the United Nations’ Marine
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) 193 suggesting
reductions in the proposed international NOx limits by twentyfive to thirty percent beginning in 2007. 194 While the U.S. felt
comfortable requesting a lower NOx standard internationally in
2001, the EPA claimed in 2003 that more time was necessary
to evaluate the capabilities of technology before tougher
standards should be imposed in the U.S. upon Category 3
vessel emissions. 195 The inconsistency between these actions is
startling.

nonroad large spark-ignition engines and recreational engines such as snowmobiles,
off-highway motorcycles, forklifts, all-terrain vehicles, and recreational marine diesel
engines which will reduce NOx emissions by 82% and PM by 60% by the time of full
implementation in 2030).
190
For example, the EPA set the fuel sulfur content standard for nonroad
diesel engines in the construction, agricultural, industrial, and mining industries to
match the 15 ppm highway diesel engine standard. 69 Fed. Reg. 38,958, supra note 52,
at 38,960.
191
Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2004). See infra
Part IV (discussing the Bluewater case).
192
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38, at 16-18.
193
MEPC 44/11/7, Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Revision of the NOx
Technical Code, Tier 2 Emission Limits for Marine Diesel Engines at or Above 130 kW,
submitted by the United States (May 2002), available at Docket A-2001-11, Document
No. II-A-16. The Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) is a committee
within the International Maritime Organization (IMO). PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at
81. The IMO is a United Nations agency, which was established in 1958 following an
international convention in Geneva. KENNETH R. SIMMONDS, THE INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME ORGANIZATION 4 (1994). See infra Part III.A (discussing the IMO).
194
MEPC 44/11/7, Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Revision of the NOx
Technical Code, Tier 2 Emission Limits for Marine Diesel Engines at or Above 130 kW,
submitted by the United States (May 2002), available at Docket A-2001-11, Document
No. II-A-16. See infra Part III.A (discussing MARPOL Annex VI and its standards).
195
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9748.
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F.

Most Vessels Entering U.S. Ports Will Be Unregulated
Under EPA’s Rule

One of the purposes of the Clean Air Act is to “protect
and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to
promote the public health and welfare.” 196 However, the EPA’s
Category 3 regulations will not achieve the CAA’s goal of
improving air quality for the benefit of the public welfare
because the rules do not apply to international vessels. 197
Studies have shown that there are approximately
88,660 marine vessels registered internationally that are over
100 gross tonnes. 198 In the 1950s, international shippers began
registering under “flags of convenience” to avoid the high costs
of trading under the U.S. flag. 199 In order to obtain such a
designation, a shipper merely needs to establish a shipping
company or representative legal entity in a particular
country. 200 Despite attempts to establish a “genuine link”
between a ship and its flag, this criteria does not reflect actual
shipping practices throughout the international community. 201
Therefore, many “flags of convenience” are held by American
owned interests. 202 Approximately 94 percent of the vessels
196

42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000).
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9747.
198
James J. Corbett, Updated Emissions From Ocean Shipping, 108 J.
GEOPHYSICAL RES., No. D20 at 3, available at http://www.ocean.udel.edu/cms/jcorbett/
CorbettKoehlerJGR2003.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2004). The international treaty,
MARPOL Annex VI, only applies to marine vessels that are 400 gross tonnes or larger.
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Chapter II, Regulation 5(1). See infra Part III
(discussing MARPOL Annex VI).
199
BRUCE FARTHING & MARK BROWNRIGG, FARTHING ON INTERNATIONAL
SHIPPING 186-87 (3d ed. 1997). See also PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 9 (explaining
that shippers often use flags of convenience to pay lower taxes or crew salaries and
social security). There are approximately twenty countries that now offer flags of
convenience, including Panama, Liberia, Cyprus, Bahamas, and Malta, which are
among the largest fleets in the world. FARTHING & BROWNRIGG, supra, at 188.
200
FARTHING & BROWNRIGG, supra note 199, at 187. Given the latest
technology, flagship status can actually be changed instantaneously without much
effort. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, SHIPPING IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS 68 (1988).
201
PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 4. Many countries began operating Open
Registries or “flags of convenience,” which ignored the ship owner’s nationality. Id. at
9. Access to the Open Registries is often very easy and can even be obtained abroad.
Id. at 10. Open Registries are usually run by countries with little power and even less
desire to consult shipping companies about the registry, id., or interest in requiring
more than mere incorporation in the country where the company desires flagship. Id.
at 11 n.27.
202
Id. at 12. Often the registries themselves are run out of locations other
than those signified by the flag. WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, THE OUTLAW SEA 5 (2004)
(explaining that ‘Liberia’ is run out of Virginia, ‘Cambodia’ is operated out of South
Korea, and a group in London operates ‘Bahamas’).
197
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that call to U.S. ports are foreign-flagged vessels. 203 As a result
of the expanding use of flags of convenience, the overwhelming
majority of Category 3 vessels entering U.S. ports will be
unregulated by the EPA. 204
To briefly summarize Part II, the EPA bowed to political
pressure by changing its original position regarding Category 3
regulation and agreeing to issue a weak rule at the urging of
the Executive Branch. The EPA’s final regulations fail to
uphold the purpose and spirit of the CAA by improperly
interpreting and applying Congress’ mandate, thereby allowing
the majority of vessels entering U.S. ports to pollute the air
without regulation. Extending this sovereignty to foreignflagged ships frustrates the purpose of the CAA and negatively
impacts the health and well-being of Americans.
III.

INTERNATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS

A.

The MARPOL Convention

The United Nations (U.N.) developed the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) to deal with global maritime
problems and to provide guidance to the international
community. 205 The intent of the IMO was to promulgate

203

67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,563.
See LANGEWIESCHE, supra note 202, at 7. See also 68 Fed. Reg. 9746,
supra note 9, at 9758 (limiting Category 3 emissions standards to new U.S.-flagged
marine vessels). Due to the increase in the use of flags of convenience to save money,
some critics claim that there are no new U.S.-flagged Category 3 vessels that will fall
under the EPA’s emissions regulation. Press Release, Bluewater Network, EPA
Lawsuit Decision Allows Shipping Pollution to Grow, (June 28, 2004),
http://www.bluewaternetwork.org/press_releases/pr2004june28_cv_ship.pdf. But see 67
Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,563 (indicating that increases in U.S. maritime
trade will require the manufacture of seven to nine new U.S.-flagged vessels per year).
205
The IMO is a United Nations agency, which was established in 1958
following an international convention in Geneva. KENNETH R. SIMMONDS, THE
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION 4 (1994). The purpose of the agency is to
promulgate standards and regulations to govern the shipping industry. Id. at 6-7.
Members of the IMO “include not only the traditional maritime countries but also those
which rely largely on the shipping services of other countries.” SAMIR MANKABADY,
THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, VOLUME 1: INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING
RULES 2 (1984). Currently, there are 166 member states in the IMO. International
Maritime Organization, Introduction to IMO, http://www.imo.org/home.asp?topic_id=3
(last visited Nov. 12, 2005). The organization is primarily comprised of an Assembly, a
Council, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), the Marine Environment Protection
Committee (MEPC), the Legal Committee, the Technical Co-operation Committee, and
the Facilitation Committee. PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 81.
204
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international standards through the passage of Conventions. 206
Therefore, before any Convention goes into effect and becomes
binding, a sufficient number of countries must ratify it, thereby
ensuring that the standard is, in fact, international. 207
In the 1970s, the IMO developed the MARPOL
Convention, 208 of which the United States is a signatory. 209 The
MARPOL Convention is a combination of two treaties adopted
in 1973 and 1978, covering prevention of pollution of the
marine environment by ships. 210 This treaty regulates oil,
chemicals, garbage, sewage, and air emissions through six
different Annexes. 211
In 1997, the IMO proposed MARPOL Annex VI to set
limits on NOx emissions from ship exhausts 212 and fuel sulfur
content. 213 Annex VI regulates the NOx emissions from diesel
engines installed on ships constructed on or after January 1,
2000 and diesel engines that have undergone a major
206

PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 83. “Convention” is merely another word
for a treaty. LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER 73 (2d ed. 1999).
207
PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 83.
208
MARPOL 73/78 is officially referred to as the International Convention for
the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of
1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78), Nov. 2, 1973, 12 ILM 1319 (1973), as amended
Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78]. International
Maritime
Organization,
Marine
Environment
Introduction,
available
at
http://www.imo.org/home.asp (last visited January 8, 2005).
209
The United States became a member of the MARPOL 73/78 Convention on
August 17, 1950. MANKABADY, supra note 205, at 416.
210
MARPOL 73/78, supra note 208.
211
Id. After rules on decision-making, information sharing, and substantive
obligations have been established by a framework convention, annexes or protocols are
often introduced to create more stringent obligations. Suh-Yong Chung, Is the
Convention-Protocol Approach Appropriate for Addressing Regional Marine Pollution?:
The Barcelona Convention System Revisited, 13 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 85 (2004).
Annex I of the MARPOL Convention prevents pollution by oil, while Annex II controls
pollution caused by noxious liquid substances. IMO, International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating
thereto
(MARPOL
73/78),
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258#7. Annex III
prevents pollution by harmful substances in packaged form. Id. Pollution by sewage
from ships is regulated by Annex IV, and Annex V prevents pollution by garbage from
ships. Id. Annex VI sets limits on air pollution from ships and prohibits the
intentional discharge of emissions of ozone depleting substances. See generally
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66. All parties must accept Annexes I and II, but
Annexes III-VI are voluntary. London Convention, The International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, MARPOL 73/78, available at
http://www.londonconvention.org/marpol_73.htm.
212
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 13.
213
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 14(1).
The Annex
additionally prohibits deliberate emissions of ozone depleting substances, which is
outside the scope of this Note. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 12.
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conversion on or after that date. 214 The Annex also limits the
sulfur content of the fuel used by Category 3 engines to a
maximum amount of 45,000 ppm. 215
Recognizing that the treaty would have to be adopted by
a majority of the international community before it would have
any effect upon international vessels, the IMO required Annex
VI to be ratified by a minimum of fifteen countries with at least
fifty percent of world merchant shipping tonnage before it
would become active. 216 After seven years, the Annex was

214
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 13(1)(a). Once the Annex
has gone into effect, it can be applied retroactively to any ship constructed or converted
on or after January 1, 2000. Letter from the International Association of Independent
Tanker Owners to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (July 16, 2002),
http://www.intertanko.com/pdf/weeklynews/IntertankoSubmission.pdf. A mandatory
NOx Technical Code defines which types of engine conversions fall under the regulation
of the Annex, as well as other details such as testing procedures, measurement
methods, approved exhaust gas cleaning systems, and the effect of using fuel composed
of blends. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 13. The Convention set NOx
emission limits according to engine speed. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66,
Regulation 13(3)(a).
215
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 14(1). Marine fuel
currently has an international maximum sulfur content of 50,000 ppm or 5%. EU
Reaches Accord on Ship Emission Sulfur Limits, LLOYD’S LIST, June 29, 2004, available
at http://lloydslist.com. However, a country may request that the sulfur limit be
lowered even further by submitting a petition to the Organization to designate a
location as a SOx Emission Control Area (SECA). MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66,
Appendix III. In a SECA, the sulfur content of fuel used by Category 3 marine engines
is limited to a maximum of 15,000 ppm. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66,
Regulation 14(4)(a). Currently, two SECAs have been designated: the Baltic Sea area
and the North East Atlantic, which is comprised of the English Channel, the North
Sea, and the Irish Sea. EPA, Final Regulatory Support Document: Control of
Emissions from New Marine Compression-Ignition Engines At or Above 30 Liters per
Cylinder
(January
2003),
at
1-9,
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/r03004.pdf. While in a SECA, a ship
may either utilize fuel that complies with this lower sulfur limitation, or the vessel
may alternatively limit SOx emissions through exhaust gas cleaning systems or other
technological methods. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 14(4)(b) & (c).
216
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Article 6(1).
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finally ratified in May 2004. 217 It went into effect in May
2005. 218
Although the U.S. has joined other sections of the
MARPOL Convention, 219 Congress has yet to ratify MARPOL
Annex VI. 220 Even if the U.S. elects not to ratify Annex VI,
which is optional, as a member to the MARPOL Convention,
the U.S. must still give effect to the treaty provisions and abide
by its mandate. 221
B.

The MARPOL “No More Favorable Treatment Clause”

To prevent states from avoiding compliance by failing to
ratify the treaty, the IMO created a “no more favorable

217

On May 18, 2004, Samoa was the fifteenth State to ratify the instrument,
raising the percentage of participating parties to 54.57% of the world merchant
shipping tonnage. Press Briefing, International Maritime Organization, Air Pollution
Rules to Enter into Force in 2005, http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?
topic_id=848&doc_id=3620 (last visited Nov. 5, 2005). Prior to that date, the other
ratifying States were: the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Norway, Panama, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and
Vanuatu. International: IMO Marine Engine Regulations, http://www.dieselnet.com/
standards/inter/imo.html. Currently, 30 countries have ratified the Annex, covering
63.72% of the world tonnage. IMO, Summary of Status of Conventions as of August 31,
2005, http://www.imo.org (follow “Conventions” hyperlink; then follow “Status of
Conventions – Summary” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
218
Press Briefing, International Maritime Organization, Air Pollution Rules
to
Enter
into
Force
in
2005,
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=848&doc_id=3620 (last visited
Nov. 5, 2005).
219
Summary of Status of Conventions as of August 31, 2005, International
Maritime
Organization,
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%
3D12899/status.xls. The U.S. has ratified MARPOL Annexes I, I, III, and V. Id.
220
The President submitted the treaty to the Senate in 2003. Press Release,
The White House, Message to the Senate of the United States (May 15, 2003),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030515-12.html.
Congress was
expected to ratify the treaty sometime in 2004. Press Release, Bluewater Network,
Shipping Air Pollution Treaty Sets Global Standards (June 7, 2004),
http://www.bluewaternetwork.org/press_releases/pr2004jun7_cv_annex.pdf. No clear
reason has been given for the U.S.’s lack of ratification of Annex VI. Letter from the
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners to the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (July 16, 2002), http://www.intertanko.com/pdf/weeklynews/
IntertankoSubmission.pdf. However, the Senate usually will not defeat a treaty
through a direct vote. BURNS H. WESTON, Treaty Power, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1910 (L. Levy, et al. eds., 1986), reprinted in GURUSWAMY,
supra note 206, at 214 [hereinafter Treaty Power]. Instead, consent is typically
withheld from a controversial treaty through committee inaction. Id. In fact,
sometimes the Senate even receives a request from the Executive Branch to withhold
or suspend committee action. Id.
221
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of Ships 1973,
Article 5(4) [hereinafter MARPOL 73].
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treatment” clause in the MARPOL Convention. 222 This clause
was intended to ensure that non-signatory states would not be
better off than parties who ratified the agreement. 223 Thus, the
clause removes the motivation for countries to avoid complying
with MARPOL provisions and the international standards of
the convention by simply refusing to ratify the treaty. 224 As a
result, the MARPOL Convention creates a true international
standard because all member States and even non-members to
the convention must comply with ratified conventions. 225
The EPA’s Category 3 emissions rule ignores the import
of the “no more favorable treatment” clause. Unlike MARPOL
Annex VI, which regulates all diesel engines installed after
January 1, 2000 or those undergoing a major conversion on or
after that date, 226 the EPA’s rule is limited to new U.S.-flagged
engines. 227 The EPA’s regulations simply will not reach the
vessel if it is foreign-flagged. 228 Therefore, the United States
will be obligated to change the EPA’s regulations to ensure that
all foreign vessels are complying with MARPOL Annex VI if
the U.S. ever opts to join the treaty. 229
The shipping industry itself has argued that even the
minor discrepancies between the EPA’s rulemaking and
MARPOL Annex VI will put U.S.-flagged vessels at a
disadvantage. 230 According to Intertanko, an international
trade association that represents most of the tanker owners
and operators throughout the world, 231 because the certification
procedures, verification requirements, and record keeping
requirements vary between the EPA’s final rulemaking and
MARPOL Annex VI, U.S.-flagged vessels will be forced to

222

Article 5(4) of MARPOL 73 states: “With respect to the ship of non-Parties
to the Convention, Parties shall apply the requirements of the present Convention as
may be necessary to ensure that no more favourable treatment is given to such ships.”
Id.
223
PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 106-07.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 110.
226
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 13(1).
227
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9747. However, the EPA adopted a
separate definition of “new vessel” which will also regulate those older U.S.-flagged
vessels that have undergone a “major conversion.” Id. at 9760.
228
See id. at 9746.
229
See MARPOL 73, supra note 221, Article 5(4).
230
Letter from the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
to
the
U.S.
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(July
16,
2002),
http://www.intertanko.com/pdf/weeklynews/IntertankoSubmission.pdf.
231
Id. at 1.
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obtain dual certification while on foreign routes. 232 Therefore,
U.S.-flagged vessels will be hampered with additional
paperwork and procedural requirements due to the EPA’s
rulemaking, 233 while foreign-flagged vessels will not be subject
to these inconveniences. 234 Hence, American vessels will be
disadvantaged, while other countries will receive more
favorable treatment.
The EPA has acknowledged that in order to reduce
marine air emissions effectively, a collaborative effort is needed
within the international community. 235 While claiming that it
instituted regulations that mimic the international standard,
the EPA has in fact acted unilaterally by promulgating
regulations that disregard the enforcement of the MARPOL
Annex VI regulations upon foreign-flagged vessels. 236 Because
the CAA and international law provide the EPA with the
authority to regulate all maritime vessels within U.S. waters, 237
the U.S. could avoid giving favorable treatment to foreignflagged vessels if it chose to regulate all vessels entering U.S.
waters. Therefore, although the EPA’s final regulation doesn’t
technically set a different emissions standard, by exempting
nearly 94 percent of the marine traffic into U.S. ports, 238 the
EPA’s rule is not only ineffective, but it also violates the spirit
of MARPOL by placing additional restrictions on US-flagged
vessels. 239
IV.

EPA CATEGORY 3 EMISSIONS REGULATIONS UPHELD

A.

The D.C. Circuit Gave Deference to EPA’s Category 3
Regulations

The EPA’s rules covering the emissions from Category 3
vessels were recently challenged in Bluewater Network v.
Bluewater Network
Environmental Protection Agency. 240
(hereinafter Bluewater) is an organization dedicated to

232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

Id. at 8.
Id.
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9747-48.
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,550.
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9747-48.
Lickel, supra note 66, at 160-65. See also Part II.E.1, supra.
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,563.
See MARPOL 73, supra note 221, Article 5(4).
372 F.3d 404 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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reducing air and water pollution and global warming. 241 The
environmental organization filed a petition for review with the
D.C. Circuit Court, challenging the EPA’s two-tiered Category
3 marine diesel engine emission standards. 242 In this petition,
Bluewater alleged that the Category 3 regulations violated
Section 213(a)(3) of the CAA because the rulemaking failed to
reduce emissions from these vessels and disregarded the
emissions from foreign-flagged ships. 243 However, the D.C.
Circuit determined that the EPA “reasonably interpreted and
implemented the CAA,” thereby denying Bluewater’s petition
for review. 244
While evaluating Bluewater’s petition, the D.C. Circuit
court applied the two-pronged test of Chevron, Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council. 245 The Chevron test dictates that
when a court decides whether an agency’s interpretation of a
statute is permissible, the court must first determine whether
Congress has spoken on the issue. 246 If Congress has clearly
expressed its intent on the issue, then both the agency and the
court must give effect to the congressional intent. 247 However,
if Congress has not spoken directly on the issue, then the court
must determine whether the agency’s decision is permissible

241
About
Bluewater
Network,
Bluewater
Network,
http://
www.bluewaternetwork.org/aboutus.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2005). Bluewater is
particularly dedicated to reducing pollution from boats and watercraft since that was
the organization’s primary purpose upon its foundation. Id.
242
Bluewater, 372 F.3d at 406. See also note 19, supra (explaining that
Bluewater was a party to the original lawsuit challenging the EPA’s 1999 marine
vessel regulations).
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Chevron involved an action brought by the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenging the EPA’s decision to allow
industrial sites to view their emissions as if they are contained in a “bubble.” Id. at
840. Under this bubble concept, as long as the net amount of emissions at the facility
do not increase, the EPA allows the company to increase emissions from a single source
as long as an equivalent decrease in emissions is made somewhere else within the
plant. Id. The NRDC alleged that this bubble concept was not a reasonable
interpretation of the term “stationary source.” Id. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. was allowed to
intervene and argue in favor of the EPA’s regulation. Id. at 841 n.4. The Court upheld
the EPA’s regulation, id. at 866, after applying the two-fold test described above.
246
Id. at 842.
247
Id. at 842-43. With regard to Congressional intent, the judiciary ordinarily
presumes that Congress does not intend to override treaties, so courts will try to
interpret federal statutes and treaties dealing with the same subject (such as the CAA
and MARPOL Annex VI here) as being compatible. Treaty Power, supra note 220, at
216. Therefore, if MARPOL Annex VI had been ratified prior to the regulation of
nonroad vehicles in the 1990s, the Bluewater court might have struck down the
exemption to foreign-flagged Category 3 vessels. Cf. id.

2005]

EPA’S CATEGORY 3 MARINE EMISSIONS STANDARDS

1097

given the construction of the statute. 248 Under this precedent,
the Bluewater court had to give Chevron deference to the EPA’s
regulations unless the court determined that the decision was
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law.” 249
Reviewing the EPA’s interpretation under the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review, the Bluewater court was
satisfied that the EPA had interpreted and implemented the
CAA in a reasonable fashion. 250 The court stated that the
agency was not required to “adopt the most stringent
standards,” but rather had to develop regulations that “reduce
emissions to the greatest degree possible after considering the
spectrum of available technologies and the costs and benefits
associated with those technologies.” 251 The court also noted
that the agency had committed itself to implementing new
technologies into tighter emissions standards when the EPA
revisits the issue in 2007. 252 Although the regulations did not
reflect the current capabilities of technology, the court was
satisfied that the agency took action “akin to the antibacksliding provision” that the D.C. Circuit had previously
upheld in Sierra Club v. EPA. 253 Finally, the Bluewater court
explained that Sierra Club states that the EPA must consider
248

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
Bluewater, 372 F.3d at 410 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2000)).
250
Id. at 411.
251
Id. at 408.
252
Id. at 412. In promulgating its final rule, the EPA opted to wait until 2007
to revisit the issue of instituting Tier 2 emissions standards, which would be lower
than the international MARPOL Annex VI levels. 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at
9749. The agency explained that there were “several outstanding technical issues
concerning the widespread commercial use of these technologies” that mandated
waiting before declaring Tier 2 emissions standards. Id. at 9748. By deferring the
declaration of Tier 2 standards, the EPA would have time to “obtain important
additional information on the use of the these [sic] advanced technologies.” Id.
According to the EPA, this
249

new information may include (1) new developments as manufacturers
continue to make various improvements to the technology and address any
remaining concerns, (2) data or experience from recently initiated in-use
installations using the advanced technologies, and (3) information from
longer-term in-use experience with the advanced technologies that will be
especially helpful for evaluating the long-term durability of emission controls.
Id. See also Part II.E.2, supra.
253
325 F.3d 374, 379-80 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Sierra Club involved a challenge to
an EPA regulation that instituted an anti-backsliding provision for motor fuel
regarding anti-toxic regulations. Id. at 378. The anti-backsliding rule in Sierra Club
would prevent refiners or importers from increasing the toxicity of the emissions from
their fuels beyond the baseline levels determined by emissions performance in 19982000. Id.
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other factors aside from technology in its decision making
process, including safety, cost, lead time, noise, and energy. 254
The D.C. Circuit noted that when it previously interpreted
statutes similar to Section 213 of the CAA, these other statutes
did not dictate how the agency must weigh all the possible
Therefore, the court
factors during its rulemaking. 255
determined that a hierarchy among the factors should not be
implied when interpreting Section 213. 256
Regarding Bluewater’s concerns about the rule’s foreign
vessel exemption, the court declared this claim premature since
Bluewater failed to respond to the EPA’s defense that waiting
to resolve the issue until the 2007 Tier 2 rulemaking would not
“lead to any significant loss in emissions reductions.” 257 The
EPA and the court both determined that this delay would not
cause losses in emissions reductions because foreign-flagged
ships would still be required to comply with the MARPOL
Annex VI standards. 258
B.

EPA Failed to Take a “Hard Look” at the Environmental
Consequences

Although arbitrary and capricious review of the EPA’s
decision is typically mandated by Chevron v. NRDC, 259 in
Bluewater, the EPA was still required to take a “hard look” 260 at
the environmental consequences of the Category 3 regulations.
In cases involving review of agency decisions, appellate courts
are typically very deferential towards the actions of agencies if
254

Bluewater, 372 F.3d at 411-12.
Id.
256
Id. But see Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The
overriding goal of [Section 213(a)(3) of the CAA] is air quality and the other listed
considerations, while significant, are subordinate to that goal.”).
257
Bluewater, 372 F.3d at 413.
258
Id. Bluewater addressed this argument in its brief by arguing that the
EPA is misconstruing its mandate, which is actually to “set standards for emissions
from new nonroad engines ‘which in the Administrator’s judgment cause, or contribute
to, [ozone] pollution.” Brief of Petitioner at 22, Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d
404 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1120) (citing 42 U.S.C. §7547(a)(3)). South Coast Air
Quality Management District submitted a separate brief noting that the argument that
there would be no loss in emission reductions was contradicted by the agency’s own
calculations showing that Category 3 emissions were expected to rise between 2000
and 2030. Brief for South Coast Air Quality Management District as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (No.
03-1120).
259
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). See notes 246-50 supra and accompanying
text, discussing the Chevron two-step analysis. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2000).
260
See note 16, supra.
255
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the issue requires technical expertise. 261 But, since the court’s
role is to ensure that the agency is publicly accountable, 262 the
public will suffer 263 if, as here, the court merely gives deference
to an agency action that fails to push technology to reduce
emissions to the lowest level achievable. 264 While it is clear
that courts must not substitute their own judgments for those
of the agency, a “court must make a careful and searching
inquiry into the facts.” 265 If the court determines that there is
an air of bias in the agency’s decision, less deference may be
appropriate even though the agency is a source of expertise on
the matter. 266 In situations where bias exists, the court must
apply substantial evidence review, which requires the court to
examine policy considerations, as well as factual evidence. 267
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has even endorsed a careful
review of the record in cases where closer scrutiny will prevent
Therefore,
judicial review from being “meaningless.” 268
agencies should substantiate their decisions with factual
evidence and sound policy decisions to ensure proper judicial
review, as well as to inspire public confidence. 269
Closer scrutiny may also be justified in CAA cases since
Congress is wary of the EPA’s actions with regard to
implementing the Act. 270 Specifically, Congress has taken a

261
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976). See also Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (“When examining
this kind of scientific determination . . . a reviewing court must generally be at its most
deferential.”).
262
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1207 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
263
Angus MacBeth, et al., Cartoon Science: The Struggle Between Politics and
Science at the Environmental Protection Agency, 6 NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 5, 24-25 (May 2002).
264
See Part II.E.2, supra (discussing technology-forcing regulations and the
EPA’s admission that technology is capable of further emissions reductions below the
standards set by the final Category 3 emissions rule).
265
Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 2d 642, 649 (E.D. La. 2002).
266
Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (explaining
that if the EPA applies a model rigidly, then the court will be forced to use a more
searching inquiry).
267
Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
268
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).
269
Am. Fed’n of Labor, 617 F.2d at 651-52. See also United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that the court’s task is
ensure public accountability “by requiring the agency to identify relevant factual
evidence, to explain the logic and the policies underlying any legislative choice, to state
candidly any assumptions on which it relies, and to present its reasons for rejecting
significant contrary evidence and argument”).
270
THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 8.

1100

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2

critical look at the EPA’s failure to clean up the ambient air, 271
declaring that “the EPA needs to change its current structure
to allow science to play a more significant role in decisions.” 272
As a result, both the House and the Senate have proposed
legislation to create a Deputy Administrator for Science and
This Deputy
Technology to oversee EPA decisions. 273
Administrator would be entrusted with the duty of ensuring
that the EPA is using appropriate and relevant research to
support its rulemaking. 274 Furthermore, the Senate noted that
in order to remove political bias from decision making within
the EPA, the Assistant Administrator for Research and
Development, who occupies the highest science job in the
agency, should be appointed to a term of six rather than four
years. 275 By politically insulating the EPA’s highest ranking
science position, the Senate hopes that the agency will focus
more on science and will be able to achieve continuity across
administrations. 276
Even the EPA has noted that over the last decade,
concerns have been growing about its ability to assess risks to
Confidence in the
human health and the ecosystems. 277
agency’s expertise is lagging for two primary reasons: research
and development only comprise about seven percent of the
agency’s total budget, 278 and policymakers are typically
attorneys lacking formal scientific training. 279
271

Id.
S. REP. NO. 108-2233, at S3184 (2004).
273
H.R. 3096, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2233, 108th Cong. (2004). See also
MacBeth et al., supra note 263, at 28-29.
274
H.R. 3096, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2233, 108th Cong. (2004). See also
MacBeth et al., supra note 263, at 28-29.
275
S. REP. NO. 108-2233, at S3184 (2004).
276
Id.
277
MacBeth et al., supra note 263, at 16.
278
Id. at 6.
279
Id. at 5. Even when the EPA is aware of environmental risks, the agency
can be placed under pressure from the Executive Branch to refrain from taking action
to enforce existing regulations. Welch, supra note 4. Former EPA Administrator
Christie Todd Whitman wrote to Vice President Dick Cheney in 2001 expressing
concern about the EPA’s lack of action to force power companies to upgrade their
emissions controls. Id. Whitman warned Cheney, “We will pay a terrible political
price if we undercut or walk away from enforcement cases. It will be hard [for the
EPA] to refute the charge that we are deciding not to enforce the Clean Air Act.” Id.
Later, Whitman remarked that “improv[ing] the role of science in decision-making”
was one of the agency’s top priorities. Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer,
“Regulatory Daubert”: A Proposal To Enhance Judicial Review Of Agency Science By
Incorporating Daubert Principles Into Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
7,
9
(2003),
available
at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp/articles/
lcp66dAutumn2003p7.htm.
272
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Due to the lack of resources and technology within the
EPA, as well as Congressional concerns of political bias, the
Bluewater court should have been less deferential to the EPA
with regard to Category 3 emissions -- a situation that also
involves international ramifications 280 and interpretation of
Congressional intent. 281 Here, the Bluewater court had a duty
to use less deference in its review of the evidence, regardless of
the EPA’s supposed expertise, due to the indications of bias on
the record. 282 For example, while the EPA claims that the
MARPOL Annex VI provisions are sufficient domestic
standards, the United States has been actively pushing the
IMO for stricter international NOx regulations for several
years. 283 Moreover, the EPA has directly acknowledged that
technological advancements are capable of further reducing
emissions. 284 In fact, the EPA notes that much of the same
technology that will be used to control Category 3 marine
emissions is similar to the technology that is used to control
emissions from highway diesel engines. 285 If the EPA has
imposed steep reductions in emissions from land-based engines
that use the same technology, 286 it is unclear why the EPA
would treat marine emissions regulations differently.
Furthermore,
the
EPA
was
originally
considering
implementing emissions controls on all vessels in U.S. waters,
including foreign-flagged vessels, and explicitly setting Tier 2
NOx reductions at thirty percent beyond the MARPOL Annex
VI standards prior to discussions with the OMB. 287 Given this
background, it is hard to believe the agency’s explanation that
it has chosen to mimic the MARPOL Annex VI standards for
now, while planning to assess the capabilities of technology to

280

See Part III, supra.
See Part II.E.1, supra.
282
See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1265 (1994) (explaining that
if the agency applies a model rigidly, then the court will be forced to use a more
searching inquiry).
283
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,554 (“At the same time, the
United States government supports a revision of the Annex VI standards for NOx
emissions, taking into account the emission reduction potential of new control
technologies.”). See supra Part II.E.2.
284
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,555. See supra Part II.E.2.
285
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,567.
286
E.g., the EPA set the fuel sulfur content standard for nonroad diesel
engines in the construction, agricultural, industrial, and mining industries to match
the 15 ppm highway diesel engine standard. 69 Fed. Reg. 38,958, supra note 52, at
38,960.
287
LETTER TO OMB, supra note 21, at 58, 72.
281
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meet lower emission standards in the future. 288 By ignoring the
bias on the record and merely pushing the EPA’s decision
through under the loose arbitrary and capricious standard, the
Bluewater court, rather than actual scientific experts,
ultimately ended up deciding that the agency’s regulations
were adequate. 289
The Bluewater court also failed to address whether the
EPA considered the most relevant data when establishing its
rulemaking. 290 Since 1970, nonroad engine and vehicle NOx
and SOx emissions have continued to climb. 291 The picture
becomes even more bleak when one considers that researchers
determined in 2003 that Category 3 vessels might actually be
responsible for producing more than twice as much NOx as
previously calculated. 292 However, the EPA based its proposal
and new regulations upon NOx and PM data collected in 1996
and then relied upon models to estimate the emissions for the
years after 1996. 293 In one of its rulemaking notices, the EPA
claimed that by applying the Tier 2 standards to just U.S.flagged vessels, NOx emissions would be reduced by
approximately eleven percent by 2030. 294 Since the EPA
utilized outmoded data as the baseline from which to formulate
its decision, the actual improvements to the environment as a
result of the new regulations could be less than the EPA
determined. If this new NOx data collected in 2003 was not
utilized by the agency, the rulemaking may have been
arbitrary and capricious for failure to use accurate scientific
methods.
Finally, the agency’s decision mandated less deference
by the court because the regulation touched on an international
issue.
Courts should extend less deference whenever a
situation involves an ambiguous statute that may conflict with
The Supreme Court determined in
international law. 295

288

See 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9748.
See MacBeth et al., supra note 263, at 25.
290
See generally Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404 (2004).
291
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT
EMISSION TRENDS: 1900-1998 (Mar. 2000), Ch. 3: National Emission Trends, 19001998, at 3-7.
292
James J. Corbett, Updated Emissions From Ocean Shipping, 108 J.
GEOPHYSICAL RES., No. D20, at 14, available at http://www.ocean.udel.edu/cms/
jcorbett/CorbettKoehlerJGR2003.pdf.
293
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 38, at 29-30.
294
Id. at 86.
295
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (1 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
289
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Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy that “an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains.” 296 Therefore, it was
inappropriate for the Bluewater court to apply deference to the
EPA’s decision because Category 3 emissions regulation
involves international vessels and will affect the U.S.’s
obligation to uphold the spirit of the no more favorable
treatment clause of the MARPOL Convention. 297
From a policy perspective, the Bluewater court should
have been skeptical of the agency’s decision to automatically
exempt 94 percent of the vessels entering U.S. ports 298 from its
pollution regulations. As discussed supra, the EPA founded its
interpretation of CAA upon improper definitions of the terms
nonroad engine and nonroad vessel. 299 Further, the EPA
declared in its final rule that the U.S. lacked jurisdiction
because these vessels are only temporarily within the
country. 300 However, these rationales directly conflict with
legal precedent 301 and the EPA’s own arguments in 2002 to the
OMB regarding interpretation of the CAA and proper
environmental policy. 302 Hence, the Bluewater court should
have considered the policy implications of allowing the EPA to
create a loophole for foreign-flagged vessels, while regulating
emissions from U.S.-flagged Category 3 vessels.
C.

The D.C. Circuit Places Burden on Bluewater

Despite the numerous reasons for which the court
should have been skeptical of at the agency’s decision, the
Bluewater court still chose to be deferential to the EPA. 303 In
supporting its deference, the court declared that Bluewater
needed to show that instituting the EPA’s regulations would
cause a loss in emissions reductions. 304 The court also assumed
that regardless of whether the EPA instituted a blanket
296

Id. See also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (quoting
Murray, 6 U.S. at 118).
297
See supra Part III.B.
298
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,563.
299
See supra Part II.E.1.
300
68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9759.
301
See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
302
See supra Part II.E.1 (discussing the EPA’s original interpretation of the
terms nonroad vehicle, nonroad engine, and import).
303
Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 410 (2004).
304
Id. at 413.
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exemption to foreign-flagged vessels, these ships would comply
with MARPOL Annex VI regulations while in U.S. ports. 305
Both of these assumptions were in error.
The Bluewater court stated that deference to the
agency’s decision was appropriate because Bluewater Network
failed to show that by instituting the Category 3 regulations,
there would be a loss in emissions reductions. 306 Here, the
court seems to say that by maintaining the status quo or
making minor improvements to air quality, the EPA fulfilled
the mandate of Section 213 of the CAA. 307 However, by putting
this burden on the petitioner to show that there will not be a
reduction in emissions by instituting weak regulations, the
court misinterpreted the purpose of Section 213. 308 When
Congress drafted this section of the CAA, the section was
written to be technology-forcing. 309 As discussed in Part II.F
infra, technology-forcing regulations are intended to provide
the greatest protection to the public health and welfare, while
the costs of implementation are secondary. Ironically, the D.C.
Circuit itself stated in 2001 that “[t]he overriding goal of
[Section 213(a)(3) of the CAA] is air quality and the other listed
considerations, while significant, are subordinate to that
goal.” 310 Therefore, one must question how the Bluewater court
can be satisfied that the agency has promulgated regulations
that adequately protect the public health and welfare if the
agency is not pressing for the development of new technology.
As a result, the effects of these lax regulations will not be
measurable within the next twenty to thirty years. 311 In fact, it
may take longer than twenty or thirty years before a positive
impact on the environment is noticeable since the MARPOL
Annex VI standards are not going to be adopted and applied to
all vessels under the EPA’s new regulations. 312 Here, the
Bluewater court had a duty to question why the agency failed
to institute regulations that would provide greater protection to

305

Id.
Id.
307
See id. at 411.
308
Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 201 (2001) (“CAA section 213 is a
technology-forcing standard.”).
309
Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (2000).
310
Husqvarna, 254 F.3d at 200.
311
Lickel, supra note 66, at 150.
312
Id.
306
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the public health and welfare. 313 Hence, the court should have
interpreted Section 213 literally and should have mandated
that the emissions regulations press for improved technology,
as Congress intended, 314 so that the improvements in air
quality could be felt sooner.
The Bluewater court also upheld the agency’s action
based upon the assumption that regardless of the EPA’s
foreign-flagged vessel exemption, foreign-flagged ships would
still comply with the MARPOL Annex VI standards. 315
However, Annex VI leaves the issue of compliance to port
states. 316 Therefore, the compliance of foreign-flagged vessels
with the international standards can only be verified through
parameter checks, which in the United States are typically
conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard. 317 The EPA’s Category 3
regulations do not order the Coast Guard to conduct parameter
checks to ensure compliance with the international
standards. 318 If the Coast Guard is not going to conduct
inspections or parameter checks upon foreign-flagged vessels,
there is no reason to assume that all foreign-flagged vessels
will automatically comply with the MARPOL Annex VI
standards while in U.S. ports. 319 Since the U.S. has yet to
313
Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651-52 (1979). See also
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating
that the court’s task is ensure public accountability “by requiring the agency to identify
relevant factual evidence, to explain the logic and the policies underlying any
legislative choice, to state candidly any assumptions on which it relies, and to present
its reasons for rejecting significant contrary evidence and argument”).
314
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 655 F.2d 318, 328
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 24 (1970), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS 424 (1974)); H.R. REP. 95-294, at 273
(1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1352.
315
Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 413 (2004).
316
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 66, Regulation 11.
317
67 Fed. Reg. 37,548, supra note 13, at 37,552. The U.S. Coast Guard has
diverse responsibilities, including maritime security, mobility, and safety, national
defense, and protection of natural resources. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Publication 1,
U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian, at 5 (Jan. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/overview/Pub%201/contents.html. Within its responsibilities of
protecting natural resources, the USCG protects marine habitats, marine mammals,
and endangered marine species, as well as enforces laws regarding the discharge of oil
and other hazardous substances into the nations waters. Id. at 10. Furthermore, the
USCG inspects foreign vessels and is the first to respond to environmental disasters.
Id.
318
See generally 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9.
319
Flag states are primarily responsible for implementing MARPOL Annex VI
and issuing the requisite certificates. PAMBORIDES, supra note 89, at 58. However, the
number of vessels operating under “flags of convenience” has rapidly been growing. Id.
at 12. Because “flags of convenience” are obtained from countries that have no means
to enforce international standards, id. at 10, it is reasonable to anticipate that
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ratify this treaty, 320 and there is no legislation in place to
implement the Annex, 321 the Bluewater court erred in stating
that compliance with the Annex standards would be assured 322
because there simply will be no one enforcing the MARPOL
Annex VI standards on foreign-flagged vessels. 323
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the United States conducts more sea-trading
than any other nation, 324 the EPA caved under political
pressure from the OMB 325 to provide a foreign-flag exemption to
Category 3 marine vessels in its emissions regulations. 326 By
failing to monitor emissions from foreign-flagged vessels, the
United States continues its pattern of exhibiting “disregard for
what is considered acceptable by the rest of the world,” 327 while
mocking the goals of the CAA. 328
sometimes Annex VI standards will not be complied with in U.S. ports without U.S.
Coast Guard enforcement. See Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International
Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 259, 263 (1992) (noting that even ratification by
a country does not mean that the agreed upon standards are being observed or
monitored).
320
International Maritime Organization, Summary of Status of Conventions
by
Country,
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D12899/
status.xls (last visited Oct. 30, 2005). See also Intertanko, 2005 Federal and State
Legislative & Regulatory Update, Oct. 4, 2005, available at http://www.intertanko.com/
pubupload/INTERTANKO.ppt (noting that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
met on September 25, 2005 to discuss the treaty).
321
See 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, supra note 9, at 9757.
322
372 F.3d 404 at 412-13.
323
A representative with the US Coast Guard who is responsible for
conveying such guidance to the field offices confirmed that “since the US has not yet
ratified Annex VI, [the Coast Guard has taken the position that it] can’t enforce it.” Email from Wayne Lundy, US Coast Guard, to Sandra Snyder (Dec. 8, 2005, 8:47 am
EST) (on file with author).
See also ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 587-600 (2d ed. 2000) (arguing that mechanisms
must be in place to supervise application of standards and rules because merely
creating the standard itself does not ensure that the problem will be resolved).
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Regardless, the EPA might find itself subject to further
litigation due to the insufficiencies of the Category 3 emissions
standards since Bluewater Network cautioned the EPA that it
might face another lawsuit if MARPOL Annex VI were ever
ratified in the U.S. 329 However, due to the amount of deference
that courts typically give to expert agencies on technical
matters, it is unlikely that further litigation will overturn the
D.C. Circuit’s decision. 330 Hence, if courts are unwilling to stop
providing deference to EPA rulemaking despite evident
political bias, it is essential for Congress to pass proposed
legislation creating the position of Deputy Administrator for
Science and Technology within the EPA and changing the
duration of term of the Assistant Administrator for Research
and Development, so that the agency is capable of focusing
more on science and less on politics. 331 If one of these steps is
not taken, the Executive Branch will continue to have the
power to make a mockery out of the CAA by requesting that
the EPA does not take all the available actions to improve air
quality.
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